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Defendant Paul Hardman, by and through his counsel of record, respectfully submits 
the following Petition for Rehearing: 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND OVERLOOKED THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN 
STATE V. PENA, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) (SEE EXHIBIT "A"). 
Defendant respectfully submits that this Court overlooked the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), (which was decided after the briefing 
in this case), in rendering its opinion and thus misapprehended the appropriate standard of 
review. In Pena, Chief Justice Zimmerman, writing for a unanimous Court, examined the 
standard of review to be applied when the trial court has applied a legal principle to the facts 
before it: 
Although the universe of questions presented for review has often been 
characterized as consisting only of mutually exclusive questions of fact and 
law, there is really a third category-the application of law to fact or, stated 
more fully, the determination of whether a given set of facts comes within the 
reach of a given rule of law. It is this determination that is at the heart of the 
dispute between the parties over the appropriate standard of review for reason-
able-suspicion determinations. [In this case Rule 26(b)(3) "anticipation of 
litigation" vs. ordinary course of business determination]. 
Id. at 936 (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that in determining the proper 
standard of appellate review, the Court must consider how much discretion is vested with the 
trial court: 
At this point, we must attempt to determine when the articulated legal rule to 
be applied to the set of facts-a rule that we establish without deference to the 
trial courts—embodies a de facto grant of discretion which permits the trial 
court to reach one of several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a 
particular set of facts without risking reversal. 
Id. at 937. The extent of discretion varies from a little, requiring a "de novo" review of the 
trial court's conclusion, to a lot, requiring "broad discretion." The Court compared the 
spectrum of discretion to a pasture: 
The helpful metaphor Professor Rosenberg uses in describing these 
degrees of discretion is that of a pasture. To the extent that a trial judge's 
pasture is small because he or she is fenced in closely by the appellate courts 
and given little room to roam in applying a stated legal principle to facts, the 
operative standard of review approximates what can be described as "de 
novo." That is, the appellate court closely and regularly redetermines the 
legal effect of specific facts. But to the extent that the pasture is large, the 
trial judge has considerable freedom in applying a legal principle to the facts, 
freedom to make decisions which appellate judges might not make themselves 
ab initio but will not reverse—in effect, creating the freedom to be wrong 
without incurring reversal. Only when the trial judge crosses an existing fence 
or when the appellate court feels comfortable in more closely defining the law 
by fencing off a part of the pasture previously available does the trial judge's 
decision exceed the broad discretion granted. 
As can be imagined, the real amount of pasture permitted a trial judge 
will vary depending on the legal issue, although the terminology we use to 
describe the operative standard of review does not begin to reflect the many 
shades of this variance. The best we can do is to recognize that such a 
spectrum of discretion exists and that the closeness of appellate review of the 
application of law to fact actually runs the entire length of this spectrum. 
Pena. 869 P.2d at 937-38. In order to determine the "size of the pasture," the Court set forth 
three factors for granting trial judges discretion on legal questions: 
(i) when the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex and 
varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all those facts can 
be spelled out; (ii) when the situation to which the legal principle is to be 
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applied is sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are unable to 
anticipate and articulate definitively what factors should be outcome determina-
tive; and (iii) when the trial judge has observed "facts," such as a witness's 
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot be 
adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts. 
Id. at 938-39. 
Such a determination is crucial to this case. If the appropriate standard of review 
vests broad discretion in the trial court to determine whether a particular document was 
prepared "in anticipation of litigation," the ruling may be affirmed although the appellate 
court found error. Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-38. Such "broad discretion" may, as the Court 
stated, be presumed: "[U]ntil the appellate court has fenced off a particular area of pasture, 
that is, determined that a particular fact situation does or does not create reasonable suspicion 
as a matter of law—the trial court has discretion to venture into that area—in other words, to 
determine whether a given set of facts satisfies the legal standard of reasonable suspicion." 
Id. at 940, n.5. 
In this case, the Utah Court of Appeals did not state the standard by which it 
reviewed the trial court's ruling, but the opinion suggests that this Court applied a "de novo" 
standard of review which provided no discretion to the trial court. In other words, this Court 
failed to determine whether the rules governing discovery "permit the trial court to reach one 
of several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts without 
risking reversal." Id. at 937. Defendant respectfully requests a rehearing to address these 
issues. 
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II. THIS COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE SUPREME COURT'S DECI-
SION IN GOLD STANDARD V. AMERICAN RESOURCES, 805 P.2d 
164 (Utah 1990). 
This Court looked for guidance in resolving this case to Gold Standard v. American 
Resources, 805 P.2d 164 (Utah 1990) (which did not involve a insurer claim file), where the 
Utah Supreme Court reviewed the decisions of other jurisdictions before setting forth factors 
to be examined in determining whether a document was created in "anticipation of litiga-
tion." The Court considered the "strict approach" that any document "which has not been 
requested by nor prepared for an attorney nor which otherwise reflects the employment of an 
attorney's legal expertise must be conclusively presumed to have been made in the ordinary 
course of business and thus not within the purview of the limited privilege of new Rule 
26(b)(3)." Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovida. 54 F.R.D. 367, 372 (N.D. 111. 
1972) (emphasis added). 
However, the Utah Supreme Court rejected this approach and instead created a test in 
which "attorney involvement is only one factor to be weighed in determining the applicability 
of the work-product privilege." Gold Standard, 805 P.2d at 169. Rather than focus exclusive-
ly upon attorney involvement, the Court counselled that a determination of "whether a 
document was prepared in anticipation of litigation should focus on the 'primary motivating 
purpose behind the creation of the document.'" Id. 
In its decision, this Court focused solely upon whether an attorney was involved in 
reaching its conclusions, although, as set forth below, there were additional factors which 
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were considered by the trial court which were overlooked by this Court. Thus, while this 
Court concludes that "Utah has only slightly modified the rigid Thomas Organ approach," 
the decision suggests a return to the "strict approach" of Thomas Organ in which attorney 
involvement is the sole and exclusive measure of "anticipation of litigation." Defendant 
respectfully submits that this Court misapprehended and did not follow the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Gold Standard. 
ffl. THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE FACTS RELIED UPON BY THE 
TRIAL COURT IN RULING THAT THE CLAIMS FILE WAS PRO-
TECTED AS PREPARED IN ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION. 
In its decision, the Utah Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
Defendant argues only that, in 1986, Utah Farm Bureau's attorney sent a letter 
instructing its claims agents on how to prepare claim reports in the event of 
litigation. This fact does not support defendant's argument that the particular 
documents prepared in this case were prepared at the request of an attorney. 
(Opinion, p. 7). In Defendant's brief, and before the trial court, Defendant presented other 
facts which were overlooked by this Court in rendering its opinion. For example, Defendant 
presented the testimony of Officer Jerry Monson, who in his report prepared on the morning 
after the accident stated: 
Action Taken: RP [Reporting Party/Hardman] wanted to show R/D [Reporting 
Deputy] the fence because he's afraid of being suied [sicl for having his horse 
cause an accident. [Emphasis added] 
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R. 311. (Utah County Offense Report, attached as Exhibit "F" to Brief and Exhibit "B" to 
this Petition). It was shortly after meeting with Officer Monson and telling him he was 
afraid of being sued that Defendant met with insurance adjuster Robert Harmon from Utah 
Farm Bureau. The reason Defendant met with Officer Monson and adjuster Harmon the 
morning after the accident was to show them that his fences had been knocked down by 
trespassers. The officer prepared a report, which was used at trial, evidencing that trespass-
ers knocked down his fence. His insurance adjuster obtained a statement and took photo-
graphs. (The photographs were provided based on "substantial need" and used at trial.) 
Defendant wanted proof that his horse being on the road was not his fault. Why did he need 
proof? Because he anticipated litigation and was "afraid of being suied [sic]." 
Rule 26(b)(3) provides that documents "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for 
trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative" are protected. 
Here, the Court of Appeals concluded that Utah Farm Bureau prepared its file in "the 
ordinary course of business" while overlooking the fact that the "party," Paul Hardman, did 
anticipate litigation, as evidenced by his statement to the sheriff (which was before his 
statement to insurance adjustor Harmon). 
Moreover, it is uncontroverted that the Plaintiff was seriously injured in the accident 
and, at the time the statement to Harmon was given, she was still in a coma. Since Mr. 
Hardman's horse was on the road, both he and his insurance company anticipated litigation 
and they were correct in anticipating that Hardman would be sued. 
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The Court also overlooked the affidavit of Utah Farm Bureau's adjuster, Greg 
Johnson, and the following concept as set forth by the Supreme Court of Washington: 
An insured is contractually obligated to cooperate with the insurance company. 
Such an obligation creates a reasonable expectation that the contents of state-
ments made by the insured will not be revealed to the opposing party. The 
insurer, on the other hand, has a contractual obligation to act as the insured's 
agent and secure an attorney. The insured cannot choose the attorney but can 
expect the agent to transmit the statement to the attorney so selected. Without 
an expectation of confidentiality, an insured may be hesitant to disclose 
everything known. Such non-disclosure could hinder representation by its 
selected attorney. 
Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 706 P.2d 212, 216 (Wash. 1985). 
In Gold Standard, the Utah Supreme Court counselled that courts should look to the 
'"primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document.'" Gold Standard, 805 
P.2d at 169. As indicated above, the primary purpose behind Mr. Hardman's call to both 
the Utah County Sheriff and Utah Farm Bureau was that he anticipated being sued as a result 
of his horses escaping and being involved in a serious accident. Utah Farm Bureau acted 
upon this fear and prepared its claim file. Defendant respectfully submits that had this Court 
considered these facts, instead of focusing solely upon attorney involvement, it could have 
concluded, as both trial judges did, that the statement was given in anticipation of litigation. 
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IV. THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE LAW BY FAILING TO CON-
SIDER WHETHER DOCUMENTS CONTAINING MENTAL IMPRES-
SIONS OF INSURANCE ADJUSTERS AND DOCUMENTS CREATED 
AFTER THE DATE THE CLAIM WAS MADE SHOULD ALSO BE 
PRODUCED. 
In its decision, this Court ruled that: 
[T]he trial court erred in holding that adjuster Harmon's investigative file was 
prepared in anticipation of litigation and therefore protected by the work-
product doctrine. 
However, the Court did not address in its opinion whether certain materials containing the 
mental impressions of Mr. Harmon and other adjusters must also be produced. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated in Gold Standard: "[I]f the documents convey the mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or party, the documents will be 
afforded heightened protection as 'opinion work product.'" Gold Standard, 805 P.2d at 168. 
Moreover, the claim file contains sixty documents which were prepared from the date of the 
accident until six months after suit was filed. The Court's opinion contains no decision 
regarding where along that time continuum the documents ceased being prepared in the 
ordinary course of business and began being prepared in anticipation of litigation. 
Attached as Exhibit "A" to the Brief and Exhibit "C" to this Petition is the Privileged 
Log of the Utah Farm Bureau File. There are several examples of documents which contain 
the mental impressions of the adjuster, including status reports, (entries 16-19 and 22), and 
Reserve Sheets (entries 11 and 14). As indicated in the initial brief, the Reserve Sheets 
contain the adjuster's estimate of what the claim could potentially be worth. The status 
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reports contain the mental impressions of the adjuster as to the respective liability of the 
parties. Obviously, Defendant submits that it would be patently unfair for the Plaintiff to 
have the benefit of the insurer's mental impressions regarding the case when the Defendant 
has no equivalent benefit. Such is contrary to what Rule 26(b)(3) was intended to protect. 
Moreover, on January 17, 1991, Mark James, counsel for Plaintiff wrote a letter to 
Utah Farm Bureau advising it of his representation and the claim he was making on behalf of 
his client. Certainly, at that time, Utah Farm Bureau had cause to anticipate litigation and 
any documents provided after that period were produced in anticipation of litigation. 
However, the Court's opinion fails to address these issues or provide guidance to the trial 
court in ruling which of the sixty documents contained in the insurer claim file should be 
produced. The decision only refers to the "investigative file" and thus, does not resolve all 
issues presented for appeal. 
V. THIS COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE BURDEN OF PROVING 
HARMLESS ERROR. 
In its decision, the Court departed from general principles of "harmless error" and 
held that: 
[T]he burden of demonstrating that the erroneous denial of a discovery request 
was not prejudicial must therefore rest with the party resisting discovery. Id. 
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However, at the same time, the Court states: 
[I]n some cases, a trial court might examine documents in camera to determine 
the import of their contents. However, this approach is unsatisfactory in this 
context. We are concerned not only with whether the requested information on 
its face might change the outcome of the trial, but also with what impact 
discovery of that information might have had on trial counsel's overall prepa-
ration and conduct in the trial. Only in the most clear-cut cases could any 
judge, without the benefit of counsel's thinking and strategy, make a determi-
nation as to whether information in the documents could aid the requesting 
party. 
(Opinion, p. 8, n.l). 
Thus, while on the one hand, the Court has placed the burden of demonstrating that 
the error was harmless upon the party resisting discovery, the Court on the other hand has 
eliminated any means of meeting that burden by stating that a Court cannot presume 
"counsel's thinking and strategy." In other words, the Court has imposed a burden upon 
Defendant but removed any means of meeting that burden, in effect ruling that any erroneous 
denial of a discovery request is reversible error per se. 
Moreover, Defendant was not aware nor advised that this Court viewed him as having 
the burden of proving "harmless error" until the Court of Appeals ruled in this case. The 
Plaintiff did not dispute in her memorandum that she maintained the burden of proving 
harmless error, and there is no Utah case authority suggesting that the party resisting 
discovery has the burden of proving harmless error. 
Defendant respectfully requests a rehearing so that he may have the opportunity to 
meet this burden. Towards that end, Defendant has attached as Exhibit "D" a copy of his 
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statement to his insurance adjuster Harmon which this Court ordered produced. Attached as 
Exhibit "E" is a copy of a chart comparing what Mr. Hardman said in the statement with 
Mr. Hardman's trial and deposition testimony. A comparison of Mr. Hardman's statement 
to his deposition and trial testimony reflects that it is, in all material respects, the same. 
Hence, a failure to produce it was harmless error. 
Arguably, this Court has acted as a finder of fact in ruling with respect to the 
contents of the unproduced statement. As the finder of fact, this Court should: (1) review 
the statement to determine if the trial court's error was harmless; and (2) invite Plaintiff's 
counsel to file a response to this Petition outlining how the contents of the statement 
constitute prejudicial error and how production of this statement at an earlier time would 
have altered his trial strategy or preparation. On the other hand, if this trial court is not the 
finder of fact, and if fairness and justice are given full consideration, this Court should 
remand this matter to the trial court for a determination as to whether or not the contents of 
the statement would have made a difference in the jury verdict before a ten day trial is 
ordered. 
In its final footnote, this Court rejected an approach which would renew remanding 
the case to the district court for a determination of whether prejudice resulted, suggesting 
there was a lack of authority for such a procedure. However, this approach was used by the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi in Dawkins v. Redd Pest Control Co., 607 So.2d 1232 (Miss. 
1992), wherein the Court held: 
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We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
compel an answer to the Dawkinses' Interrogatory Number 4. As noted by 
another court in another jurisdiction: 
Erroneous denial of a discovery is ordinarily prejudicial in the 
absence of circumstances showing it is harmless. Here, since we 
cannot determine from the record whether the requested docu-
ments might have changed the result in this trial, we cannot say 
the error was harmless. 
Weakee v. Norton. 621 F.2d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, we 
reverse and remand for further proceedings during which the Dawkinses may 
have the discovery requested. We are, of course, not in a position to deter-
mine whether the information to be developed will warrant a new trial as 
to the issues of fraud, gross negligence, and punitive damages, and we, 
therefore, leave that determination to the sound discretion of the trial 
court in accordance with our rules of civil procedure. 
Id. at 1236 (emphasis added). This is consistent with the sound rule developed in this 
jurisdiction which provides that the trial court exercises discretion in determining whether an 
error is prejudicial, thereby warranting a new trial. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 
789, 799 (Utah 1991). Defendant respectfully submits that the appropriate procedure would 
remand this matter to the trial court for a factual determination of whether the error was 
harmless. 
VI. THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE IMPACT OF ITS DECISION 
UPON INSURANCE CLAIMS PRACTICES. 
Defendant respectfully contends that this Court misapprehended the impact its 
decision would have upon the insurance industry and claim procedures. This Court (in a 
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panel composed of Judge Orme, Judge Bench, and Judge Greenwood) has imposed upon 
insurers in "third party" cases such as this a "fiduciary duty to its insured to protect the 
insured's interest as zealously as it would its own." Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 840 P.2d 130, 138 (Utah App. 1992). This Court has also held that "an insurer acts an 
agent for the insured with respect to the disputed claim" because "the insured is wholly 
dependent upon the insurer to see that the insured's interests are protected." Id. at 138. 
However, with this decision, this Court holds that despite this fiduciary obligation, 
the insurer has a duty to produce its claim file. This creates a fundamental inconsistency 
whereby, on the one hand, the insurer has a duty to zealously investigate the claim to fulfill 
its fiduciary obligation, but on the other hand it must do so with the full knowledge that any 
investigation conducted by the "agent" (in this case, Utah Farm Bureau) will be given to and 
used by the opposition for the express purpose of destroying the "principal" (in this case, 
Hardman). This Court's decision makes the "fiduciary" (Utah Farm Bureau) the instrument 
or "agent" of the plaintiff (Askew). 
The drafters of Rule 26(b)(3) recognized this fiduciary duty in protecting documents 
prepared by or for a party's representative "including his attorney, consultant, surety, 
indemnitor, insurer, or agent)." The 1970 revisions to this Rule, which added this language, 
reflected this Court's own holdings that an insurer has duties similar to that of an attorney— 
both are "fiduciaries" whose duty it is to "zealously defend the interests of the" client or 
insured. However, this Court denies to the insurer the same benefits which it provides to the 
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attorney as a matter of right. If an attorney "fiduciary" takes a statement to protect his client 
or prepare his case, it is conclusively presumed under Gold Standard and this Court's 
decision to be taken in "anticipation of litigation." However, if an insurer "fiduciary" takes 
the identical statement, it is not. 
These considerations were not addressed in Gold Standard because that case dealt with 
an "in house" investigative report rather than an insurer's claim file. However, a case relied 
upon by the Court in Gold Standard examined the distinction between in-house files and the 
role of the insurer. Janicker v. George Washington Univ.. 94 F.R.D. 648 (D.D.C. 1982). 
There, the Court held that an in-house memorandum prepared regarding an accident was not 
protected because it was prepared in the ordinary course of business. However, "the 
investigative file of the Hartford Insurance Company would appear to have been prepared in 
anticipation of claims, which if denied, would have clearly led to suits and litigation." Id- at 
651. 
After the briefing in this case, the District Court of Colorado considered whether a 
claim file prepared with respect to a third-party claim (liability insurance) was protected. The 
Court noted that "liability insurance is nothing more than litigation insurance" and held as 
follows: 
For this reason, it is logical to conclude that, while claims generated in 
relation to first party claims are made in the ordinary course of business and 
are discoverable, files generated during the investigation of third party claims 
are made in anticipation of litigation and are not discoverable. 
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Weitzman v. Blazing Pedals. Inc., 151 F.R.D. 125, 126 (D. Colo. 1993). 
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its decision in light of the 
impact which such a holding will have upon insurance claim practices and the duties owed by 
an insurer to an insured. The impact of this Court's decision is already beginning to be 
realized. Attached as Exhibit MF" is a copy of a Request for Production of Documents 
served in a civil case pending in the Third Circuit Court for Salt Lake County. This Court's 
decision will create a similar situation in almost all civil cases, but this Court's decision 
provides little analysis which would allow the trial court to resolve such a discovery request. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests a rehearing. 
DATED this ^ 5 ~ day of October, 1994. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Stephen'G. Morgan 
Mitchel T. Rice 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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A» 
Stephen'G. Morgan / 7 
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Tab A 
932 Utah 869 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Affirmed as to B & B; reversed and re-
manded as to Curtis. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, J J., concur. 
= KEY NUMBER SYSTEM £> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jose Carlos PENA, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 930101. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 15, 1994. 
Defendant conditionally pled guilty in 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Homer F. Wilkinson, J., to attempted unlaw-
ful possession of controlled substance, after 
denial of his motions to suppress evidence. 
Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals 
certified case to the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, C.J., held that: 
(1) police stop of automobile in which defen-
dant was passenger was supported by rea-
sonable suspicion, despite fact that police had 
not beforehand interviewed store clerk who 
reported robbery to assure that crime had 
taken place; (2) defendant effectively waived 
his rights when police read Miranda warn-
ings to him; and (3) strip search of defen-
dant at jail after his arrest was supported by 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was car-
rying drugs. 
Affirmed. 
Howe, J., concurred in result. 
1. Criminal Law <s=>1158(l) 
For purposes of determining appellate 
court's standard of review of trial court rul-
ing, "factual questions" are generally regard-
ed as entailing the empirical, such as things, 
events, actions, or conditions happening, ex-
isting, or taking place, as well as the subjec-
tive, such as state of mind. 
See pubiication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
2. Criminal Law <3=>1134(3) 
For purposes of determining appellate 
court's standard of review of trial court rul-
ing, "legal determinations" are defined as 
those which are not of fact but are essentially 
of rules or principles uniformly applied to 
persons of similar qualities and status in 
similar circumstances. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
3. Criminal Law <3=>1158(1) 
Trial courts are given primary responsi-
bility for making determinations of fact. 
4. Criminal Law <3»1158(1) 
Findings of fact are reviewed by appel-
late court under clearly erroneous standard. 
5. Criminal Law e=*1158(l) 
For reviewing court to find clear error 
in trial court's findings of fact, it must decide 
that findings are not adequately supported 
by record, resolving all disputes in evidence 
in light most favorable to trial court's deter-
mination. 
6. Criminal Law <2>1159.4(2) 
Trial judge is considered to be in best 
position to assess credibility of witnesses and 
to derive sense of proceeding as a whole, 
something appellate court cannot hope to 
garner from cold record. 
7. Criminal Law e=>1134(3) 
Appellate review of trial court's determi-
nation of law is usually characterized by term 
"correctness." 
8. Criminal Law <s=>1134(3) 
For purposes of appellate review of trial 
court's determination of law, "correctness" 
means that appellate court decides matter 
for itself and does not defer in any degree to 
trial judge's determination of law. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
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9. Criminal Law o=>1134(3) 
In the abstract, effect of given set of 
facts is question of law and, thus, one on 
which appellate court owes no deference to 
trial court's determination. 
10. Criminal Law 01134(3) 
Proper standard of review to be applied 
to trial court determination of whether spe-
cific set of facts gives rise to reasonable 
suspicion so as to support police stop is de-
termination of law and is reviewable nonde-
ferentially for correctness, as opposed to be-
ing fact determination reviewable for clear 
error. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Const. 
Art. 1, § 14. 
11. Criminal Law <3=>1134(3) 
Legal standard for reasonable suspicion 
to support police stop is standard that con-
veys measure of discretion to trial judge 
when applying standard to given set of facts. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; Const. Art. 1, 
§ 14. 
12. Criminal Law C=*ll34(3) 
Sufficiently careful appellate review of 
trial court's application of standard of rea-
sonable suspicion to support police stop is 
necessary to assure that purposes of reason-
able suspicion requirement are served. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4; Const. Art. 1, 
§ 14. 
13. Arrest <3=>63.5(6) 
Police stop of automobile in which defen-
dant was passenger was supported by rea-
sonable suspicion, despite fact that police had 
not beforehand interviewed store clerk who 
reported robbery to assure that crime had 
taken place, where dispatched report gave 
officer sufficient information for him to form 
reasonable suspicion that defendant or driver 
of automobile had committed crime. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4; Const. Art. 1, 
§ 14. 
14. Criminal Law <£»412.2(5) 
Defendant effectively waived his rights 
when police read Miranda warnings to him, 
despite defendant's contention that he did 
not fully understand English, as trial court 
found that defendant had no problem under-
standing English. 
v. PENA 
932 (Utah 1994) 
15. Criminal Law e=>412.2(5) 
Utah 933 
Waiver of Miranda rights may be in-
ferred from defendant's actions and words, 
and is based on totality of the circumstances. 
16. Criminal Law o^ >1134(3) 
Supreme Court reviews for correctness 
trial court's legal conclusion of defendant's 
valid waiver of rights upon being read Mi-
randa warnings. 
17. Criminal Law e»l 134(3) 
Standard of appellate review of trial 
court's legal conclusion of defendant's valid 
waiver of rights upon being read Miranda 
warnings grants measure of discretion to tri-
al court because of variability of factual set-
tings. 
18. Arrest e=>63.4(15) 
Police officers had probable cause to ar-
rest defendant for giving false personal infor-
mation to police officer; upon valid police 
stop of automobile in which defendant wTas 
passenger, defendant gave name as his own 
that he was unable to spell on two occasions, 
and no arrest record was found by dispatcher 
under name given by defendant, despite offi-
cer's recollection that defendant had recently 
been arrested. U.C.A.1953, 76-8-507; 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
19. Arrest e»71.1(9) 
Strip search of defendant at jail after his 
arrest for giving false personal information 
to police officer was supported by reasonable 
suspicion that defendant was carrying drugs 
and, thus, search did not violate Fourth 
Amendment; police officer knew that defen-
dant had previously been arrested for drug 
offense, and officer had observed defendant 
with his handcuffed hands in back of his 
pants as though attempting to conceal some-
thing. U.C.A.1953, 76-8-507; U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
20. Criminal Law e=>1031(l) 
Because he failed to raise it at suppres-
sion hearing prior to his conditional guilty 
plea, defendant was precluded from arguing 
on appeal that arresting officers exceeded 
permissible scope of interference. 
934 Utah 869 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen. and David B. 
Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff. 
Lisa J. Remal and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant. 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
Jose Carlos Pena appeals the trial court's 
denial of several motions to suppress evi-
dence prior to his guilty plea for attempted 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, 
a class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (7). Pena raises four 
claims of error regarding the trial court's 
evidentiary rulings: (i) The initial stop by 
police was not supported by reasonable sus-
picion; (ii) Pena did not voluntarily waive his 
Miranda rights; (iii) the misdemeanor arrest 
was a pretext for the strip search; and (iv) 
the strip search that produced the critical 
evidence was unlawful. This case was certi-
fied to this court by the Utah Court of Ap-
peals under rule 43 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. We affirm. 
On April 10, 1991, the Salt Lake City 
Police Department received a call from a 7-
Eleven clerk reporting a theft of prophylac-
tics by a Hispanic male. A description of the 
suspect and the vehicle in which he was 
riding, including the license number, was 
broadcast. Shortly thereafter, Officer Dale 
Bench sighted the suspect vehicle and pulled 
it over. The vehicle contained the driver and 
one passenger. The passenger was later 
identified as defendant Pena. 
A second officer, Officer Buckholts, arrived 
to assist Officer Bench, and the suspects 
were then asked to step out of the car. Pena 
apparently matched the description of the 
theft suspect. A third officer, Officer Ste-
vens, arrived and recognized Pena as having 
recently been arrested for a drug offense. 
Officer Stevens could not remember Pena's 
name. Pena, who had no identification, told 
police his name was Marcello Flores. How-
ever, on two occasions, he was unable to spell 
the last name correctly, giving police the 
spelling M-a-r-c-e-1-l-o F-o-s-e-s. 
1. Salt Lake City Police Department policy allows 
officers to issue citations for certain misdemean-
ors. However, identification or some other 
Pena's inability to spell "Flores" led police 
to suspect that he was lying about his identi-
ty. Officer Buckholts, who knew that the 
prior drug arrest would be entered on the 
police computer, requested that a dispatcher 
search the records for the arrest under the 
name Marcello Flores. No record was 
found. The officers then arrested Pena for 
giving false personal information to an offi-
cer, a misdemeanor.1 See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-507. 
While transporting Pena to jail, Officer 
Buckholts saw Pena ''moving around quite a 
bit in the seat, . . . putting his [handcuffed] 
hands down the back of his pants . . . , [and] 
trying to move them around to the front." 
These actions led Buckholts to believe that 
Pena was concealing narcotics. When they 
arrived at the jail, Buckholts requested that 
Pena be strip searched. During that search, 
jail personnel discovered cocaine. 
Pena was charged with unlawful posses-
sion of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony under section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), and 
with giving false personal information to a 
peace officer, a class C misdemeanor under 
section 76-8-507. Pena moved to suppress 
statements he made prior to the arrest as 
well as to suppress the cocaine. He argued 
that the police violated his rights under the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and article 1, sections 12 
and 14 of the Utah Constitution. The trial 
court denied the motions. Pena then en-
tered, and the court accepted, a conditional 
guilty plea to the lesser offense of attempted 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, 
a class A misdemeanor. The conditional plea 
preserved Pena's right to appeal the suppres-
sion ruling. He appealed to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, and the matter was argued to a 
panel of the court. That court certified the 
case to us before decision, pursuant to rule 
43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
We first address the proper standard of 
review for determinations of reasonable sus-
picion, which appears to be the reason for the 
means of determining an individual's name and 
birth date is required before a citation may be 
issued. 
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court of appeals' certification of this case.2 
The State argues that we should apply the 
clearly erroneous standard because reason-
able-suspicion determinations are fact inten-
sive and clearly erroneous is the standard 
that we have suggested is appropriate for 
fact questions. Pena, on the other hand, 
argues that the standard of review should be 
correctness because reasonable suspicion is a 
legal conclusion. Both parties find support 
for their contentions in various of our opin-
ions and those of the court of appeals. 
We recognize that this court and the court 
of appeals have created some confusion with 
regard to standards of review, perhaps in 
part because this court has not focused much 
attention on the articulation of those stan-
dards until recently, when they assumed an 
increased level of importance. See State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1268-69 (Utah 
1993). In State v. Mendoza, we reviewed a 
reasonable-suspicion determination regard-
ing an investigatory stop under a clearly 
erroneous standard, upholding the trial 
court's ruling. 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 
1987). However, in State v. Ramirez, we 
suggested that all applications of law to find-
ings of fact that produce conclusions of law 
are reviewed under a nondeferential stan-
dard, i.e., for correctness. 817 P.2d 774, 781-
12 (Utah 1991). Until recently, the court of 
appeals tended to followT the language we 
lsed in Mendoza, concluding that the issue 
vas one of fact, because the deferential stan-
iard of review had been used.3 See State v. 
Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah Ct.App. 
.991), cert denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
992); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 
Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 
. Counsel for both parties tell us that when this 
case was argued before the court of appeals, the 
standard of review issue was the subject of much 
discussion. From that fact and from the fact 
that the case seems otherwise unexceptional, we 
assume that the standard of review is the reason 
for the certification. For that reason, we treat 
the issue in some depth, although how it is 
decided may not be outcome determinative. 
In the future, it would be of assistance to this 
court if, when the court of appeals certifies a 
case to us under rule 43, it would include a 
statement of reasons so that we can be sure we 
address the issues it deems important. 
In retrospect, it is not clear whether Mendoza 
meant that the reasonable-suspicion determina-
v. PENA Utah 935 
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489, 493 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. Sery, 
758 P.2d 935, 941-42 (Utah Ct.App.1988). In 
State v. Munsen, however, the court of ap-
peals applied a correction-of-error standard 
in reviewing a reasonable-suspicion determi-
nation. 821 P.2d 13, 14-15 (Utah Ct.App. 
1991), cert denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
We endeavored to clarify this matter gener-
ally in Thurman, but did not specifically 
address the standard of review for reason-
able suspicion in that case. 846 P.2d at 1270 
n. 11. 
[1,2] Determination of the proper stan-
dard of review requires a brief discussion 
which we hope will bring some clarity to 
discussions of the issue. At the most basic 
level, two different types of questions are 
presented to a trial court: questions of law 
and questions of fact. Factual questions are 
generally regarded as entailing the empirical, 
such as things, events, actions, or conditions 
happening, existing, or taking place, as well 
as the subjective, such as state of mind. See 
Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review— 
Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 Marq.L.Rev. 
231, 236 (1991) [hereinafter Hofer]. Legal 
determinations, on the other hand, are de-
fined as those which are not of fact but are 
essentially of rules or principles uniformly 
applied to persons of similar qualities and 
status in similar circumstances. Id. 
[3-6] Trial courts are given primary re-
sponsibility for making determinations of 
fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by an 
appellate court under the clearly erroneous 
standard. For a reviewing court to find 
clear error, it must decide that the factual 
tion was one of fact, which would clearly be 
wrong, or whether it meant that this issue is an 
application of law to fact upon which a trial 
court should be given some discretion and the 
"clearly erroneous" language was used to sug-
gest that fact. Such a use of the term "clearly 
erroneous" to refer to a standard of review for 
the application of law to fact, although technical-
ly incorrect and potentially quite confusing, is 
not uncommon. See Evan Tsen Lee, Principled 
Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal 
Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 
64 S.Cal.L.Rev. 235, 236-37 (1991). In any 
event, the result in Mendoza would not have been 
different if a de novo standard had been applied. 
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findings made by the trial court are not 
adequately supported by the record, resolv-
ing all disputes in the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's determina-
tion. See Wessel v. Enckson Landscaping 
Co., 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985); see also 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 
333 U.S. 364, 395. 68 S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 
746 (1948). This standard is highly deferen-
tial to the trial court because it is before that 
court that the witnesses and parties appear 
and the evidence is adduced. The judge of 
that court is therefore considered to be in the 
best position to assess the credibility of wit-
nesses and to derive a sense of the proceed-
ing as a whole, something an appellate court 
cannot hope to garner from a cold record. 
In re J. Children, 664 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 
1983). 
[7,8] When it comes to reviewing trial 
court determinations of law, however, the 
standard of review is not phrased as "clearly 
erroneous." Rather, appellate review of a 
trial court's determination of the law is usual-
ly characterized by the term "correctness." 
Controlling Utah case law teaches that "cor-
rectness" means the appellate court decides 
the matter for itself and does not defer in 
any degree to the trial judge's determination 
of law. State v. Deli 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 
1993); see Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax 
Cornrn'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). 
This is because appellate courts have tradi-
tionally been seen as having the power and 
duty to say what the law is and to ensure 
that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. 
Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omni-
science of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn.L.Rev. 
751, 779 (1957); see Thurman, 846 P.2d at 
1266. In other words, one can visualize the 
traditional standard-of-review scheme as a 
continuum of deference anchored at either 
end by the clearly erroneous and correction-
of-error standards, which correspond with 
whether the issue is characterized as one of 
fact or of law. 
The parties here have characterized the 
standard-of-review question before us in 
terms of this fact/law distinction and argue 
the issue as though the options were meta-
phorically black and white—one option being 
"clearly erroneous" and the other "correct-
ness," with the first requiring very broad 
deference to the trial court and the second 
none. It is common for parties to character-
ize the standard-of-review debate in such a 
polarized manner. Steven A. Childress, A 
Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil 
Appeals, 125 F.R.D. 319, 328 (1989); see 
Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making 
and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate 
Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 
S.Cal.L.Rev. 235, 239-45 (1991). However, 
we think that these distinctions tend to ob-
scure the real issues. Although the universe 
of questions presented for review has often 
been characterized as consisting only of mu-
tually exclusive questions of fact or law, 
there is really a third category—the applica-
tion of law to fact or, stated more fully, the 
determination of whether a given set of facts 
comes within the reach of a given rule of law. 
It is this determination that is at the heart of 
the dispute between the parties over the 
appropriate standard of review for reason-
able-suspicion determinations. And it is a 
dispute with real consequences. 
Although implicitly recognizing this fact-
to-law category of issues, the parties act as 
though there are only two possible standards 
of review—correctness and clearly errone-
ous. The State would like us to defer to a 
trial judge's determination that on a particu-
lar set of facts reasonable suspicion was 
present, thus raising a very substantial hur-
dle to one challenging such a trial court 
determination. On the other hand, Pena 
would like the opportunity to convince an 
appellate court that the trial judge's factual 
findings do not satisfy the legal standard for 
reasonable suspicion. He wants us to make 
this decision without deferring at all to the 
trial judge on the application of the legal 
standard to the facts: in other words, to 
address the matter entirely de novo under a 
correctness standard. 
[9] This third category of determinations 
raises thorny issues. In the abstract, the 
effect of a given set of facts is a question of 
law and, therefore, one on which an appellate 
court owes no deference to a trial court's 
determination. In recognition of this fact, 
the standard of review for such determina-
tions is termed one of "correctness." This is 
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the message in Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781-82, 
and in Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270 n. 11. and 
it contradicts the State's claim that a clearly 
erroneous standard of review is appropriate 
here. To this degree, Pena is correct as to 
the stated standard of review. 
Nonetheless, the critical question, and one 
of some subtlety, arises only after we have 
said that an issue is a question of law and no 
deference is owed the trial court. At this 
point, we must attempt to determine when 
the articulated legal rule to be applied to a 
set of facts—a rule that we establish without 
deference to the trial courts—embodies a de 
facto grant of discretion which permits the 
trial court to reach one of several possible 
conclusions about the legal effect of a partic-
ular set of facts without risking reversal. 
This is really the point of the debate before 
us. Put in terms of this case, does the legal 
standard of reasonable suspicion grant any 
discretion to the trial judge in applying that 
standard to a set of facts? We think it does. 
How much? Any answer requires a brief 
discussion of the discretion that may be given 
.rial judges to determine the application of 
itated legal principles to facts. 
As stated earlier, it is our role as an 
ippellate court to define what the law is, and 
re never defer to any degree to a trial court 
n that count. That statement does not, 
owever, tell us much about howr closely we 
hould scrutinize the application of a state-
lent of legal principle to a specific set of 
icts. Yet this is a critical question, for at 
ottom, what a legal principle means in reali-
' can often be determined only by consider-
g how its general terms are given sharp 
ifinition through their application to a ser-
s of specific fact situations. See Hofer at 
'4. Determining what the law is actually 
volves an inductive process as much as a 
ductive one. The governing legal standard 
as often derived by abstraction from spe-
ic applications as it is defined in the ab-
%act and then applied to specific situations. 
t while we generally consider de novo a 
al court's statement of the legal rule, we 
en review with far less rigor the court's 
termination of the legal consequences of 
ts. The question before us today is 
ether we can derive any principles to de-
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termine when such scrutiny should be close 
and when it should not and what those prin-
ciples tell us about reviewing a finding of 
reasonable suspicion. 
We find much useful analysis on the rather 
arcane topic of the degree of discretion to be 
accorded a trial court's application of legal 
propositions to facts in an excellent article by 
Professor Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Dis-
cretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From 
Above, 22 Syracuse L.Rev. 635 (1971) [here-
inafter Rosenberg]. Professor Rosenberg 
describes the spectrum of discretion that 
may be granted to a trial judge on questions 
of law as running from "correctness" to 
"abuse of discretion." However, we decline 
to use this terminology because in Utah, we 
have used the term "correctness" to refer to 
the concept that an appellate court need not 
defer to a trial court in the determination of 
what the law is, including the legal conse-
quences of a particular set of facts, and we 
think that the term "abuse of discretion" has 
no tight meaning. Compare Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 
1991) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict) 
with State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 
(Utah 1992) (abuse-of-discretion standard for 
rule 403 rulings). But if the terminology is 
altered to fit our conceptual framework by 
labeling the spectrum of discretion in func-
tional terms, running from "de novo" on the 
one hand to "broad discretion" on the other, 
Professor Rosenberg's discussion is directly 
pertinent to the questions before us. 
The helpful metaphor Professor Rosen-
berg uses in describing these degrees of 
discretion is that of a pasture. To the extent 
that a trial judge's pasture is small because 
he or she is fenced in closely by the appellate 
courts and given little room to roam in apply-
ing a stated legal principle to facts, the oper-
ative standard of review approximates what 
can be described as "de novo." That is, the 
appellate court closely and regularly redeter-
mines the legal effect of specific facts. But 
to the extent that the pasture is large, the 
trial judge has considerable freedom in ap-
plying a legal principle to the facts, freedom 
to make decisions which appellate judges 
might not make themselves ab initio but will 
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not reverse—in effect, creating the freedom 
to be wrong without incurring reversal. 
Only when the trial judge crosses an existing 
fence or when the appellate court feels com-
fortable in more closely defining the law by 
fencing off a part of the pasture previously 
available does the trial judge's decision ex-
ceed the broad discretion granted. 
As can be imagined, the real amount of 
pasture permitted a trial judge will vary 
depending on the legal issue, although the 
terminology we use to describe the operative 
standard of review does not begin to reflect 
the many shades of this variance. The best 
we can do is to recognize that such a spec-
trum of discretion exists and that the close-
ness of appellate review of the application of 
law to fact actually runs the entire length of 
this spectrum. 
Our case law provides some examples of 
legal issues that can be placed at points along 
this spectrum of discretion, although we have 
never spoken of what we are doing in quite 
these terms. At the extreme end of the 
discretion spectrum would be a decision by 
the trial court to grant or deny a new trial 
based on insufficiency of the evidence. See 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988); 
see also Utah R.Civ.P. 50(d). In reviewing 
this sort of decision, we give the trial court a 
great deal of pasture. See Crookstoru 817 
P.2d at 799; Hansen, 761 P.2d at 17. Also 
toward the broad end of the spectrum is the 
decision to admit or exclude evidence under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403. See Hamilton, 
827 P.2d at 239-40. Other rulings on the 
admission of evidence also generally entail a 
good deal of discretion. See, e.g., Russell v. 
Russell 212 Utah 12, 852 P.2d 997, 999 
(1993); State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 
1241 (Utah), cert, denied, — U.S. , 114 
S.Ct. 476, 126 L.Ed.2d 427 (1993). 
On the other hand, there are situations in 
which we narrow the pasture considerably 
for policy reasons. One such example in-
volves consent to a search that would other-
wise violate the Fourth Amendment. See 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1269-71. Finally, at 
the de novo end of the spectrum are issues 
such as whether a "municipal function" has 
been delegated to a state commission in vio-
lation of article VI, section 28 of the Utah 
Constitution. See Utah Assoc. Mun. Pwvei 
Sys. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 789 P.2d 298, 
301-02 (Utah 1990); City of West Jordan v. 
State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 533 
(Utah 1988). 
Occasionally, we expand or contract the 
size of the pasture in response to things we 
learn over time. A recent example is evi-
denced by our decision in Soter's, Inc. v. 
Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 857 
P.2d 935 (Utah 1993). In a series of earlier 
cases, we had ruled that waiver was or was 
not present as a matter of law on the specific 
facts of those cases. This entailed fairly 
close scrutiny of the application of the gener-
al stated waiver principles to particular fact 
situations. In the course of those decisions, 
we attempted to incorporate into the state-
ment of the law of waiver those facts that led 
us to decide each of those cases as we did. 
See Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 
(Utah 1983). Over time, we appeared to 
have developed hopelessly inconsistent elabo-
rations on the basic statement of waiver prin-
ciples. In Soters, we acknowledged that 
fact, as well as the futility of attempting such 
elaborations. 857 P.2d at 939. We then 
stripped the statement of the law back to its 
most basic form and told the trial courts to 
apply it. Id at 942. The net effect was to 
say that waiver is a highly fact-dependent 
question, one that we cannot profitably re-
view de novo in every case because we can-
not hope to work out a coherent statement of 
the law through a course of such decisions. 
In terms of our present discussion, Soter's 
increased the size of the trial court's pasture 
because we found ourselves unable to de-
scribe the shape of the smaller one with 
adequate clarity. 
All the foregoing helps in understanding 
the reality that underlies the rather wooden 
characterization of standards of review which 
we often use when discussing the application 
of law to facts. And that reality suggests 
criteria for determining when some degree of 
deference may be given a trial court's appli-
cation of a particular principle of law to 
specific facts. A number of reasons usually 
given for granting trial judges discretion on 
legal questions are canvassed by Professor 
Rosenberg. He finds three reasons that are 
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useful in discerning when some degree of 
discretion ought to be left to a tnal court: (i) 
when the facts to which the legal rule is to be 
applied are so complex and varying that no 
rule adequately addressing the relevance of 
all these facts can be spelled out; (ii) when 
the situation to which the legal principle is to 
be applied is sufficiently new to the courts 
that appellate judges are unable to anticipate 
and articulate definitively what factors 
should be outcome determinative; and (iii) 
when the trial judge has observed "facts," 
such as a witness's appearance and demean-
or, relevant to the application of the law that 
cannot be adequately reflected in the record 
available to appellate courts. Rosenberg at 
662-63. 
Of course, there are countervailing policy 
reasons for not granting broad discretion to a 
trial court. For example, in Thurman, we 
found that while there were varying fact 
patterns that would be relevant to determi-
nations of voluntariness of consent, they 
were not so unmanageable in their variety as 
to outweigh the interest in having uniform 
4. We reiterate that "[w]e review the factual find-
ings underlying the trial court s decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a 
clearly erroneous standard " State v Brown, 
853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) It is not within 
the appellate court s authority to review de novo 
the factual underpinnings of a motion to sup-
press. 
Some may take issue with the our decision not 
to use the term ' clearly erroneous" in the con-
text of reasonable-suspicion determinations, be-
cause that term is already m common usage 
The change is necessary, however, m light of our 
new analytical perspective As noted before, we 
use the term "clearly erroneous to describe the 
standard by which we review purely factual de-
terminations This standard represents a fixed 
allocation of power and responsibility between 
the trial and appellate courts that is grounded in 
our distinct and unchanging institutional compe-
tencies regarding questions of fact. Because 
there is no inherent policy component in fact 
determinations, it will never be appropriate for 
an appellate court to overturn a trial court's 
factual determinations when they have substan-
tial record support. Given this grounding, we 
decline to utilize the term "clearly erroneous" to 
describe the standard used to review determina-
tions that are not forever beyond the power or 
responsibility of the appellate court to substitute 
its judgment, but have only been placed tempo-
rarily beyond the reach of de novo review as a 
matter of appellate court forbearance for institu-
tional policy reasons. We think that clarity of 
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legal rules regarding consent to search, given 
the substantial Fourth Amendment interests 
lost as a result of such consents. Thurman, 
846 P.2d at 1271. 
[10-12] With these considerations in 
mind, we move on to the question of the 
standard of review appropriate to reason-
able-suspicion determinations. We conclude 
that the proper standard of review to be 
applied to a trial court determination of 
whether a specific set of facts gives rise to 
reasonable suspicion is a determination of 
law and is reviewable nondeferentially for 
correctness, as opposed to being a fact deter-
mination reviewable for clear error.4 We 
further conclude that the reasonable-suspi-
cion legal standard is one that conveys a 
measure of discretion to the trial judge when 
applying that standard to a given set of facts. 
Precisely how much discretion we cannot say, 
but we would not anticipate a close, de novo 
review. On the other hand, a sufficiently 
careful review is necessary to assure that the 
purposes of the reasonable-suspicion require-
ment are served.5 
thought is promoted by usmg a different term to 
convey that reasonable suspicion is ultimately a 
legal question, and thus the appellate court does 
have the ultimate authority to define, as it deems 
appropriate, the contours of the disputed term. 
Admittedh, this lexical change ma> engender 
some confusion in the short term as appellate 
judges and counsel become accustomed to it In 
the long run, however, it should prevent the 
development of two somewhat divergent and 
likely confused lines of precedent, both purport-
ing to apply to the same standard of review. If 
we failed to make this change, ' clearly errone-
ous" would refer to situations in which the trial 
court has fixed discretion and the appellate court 
has a permanently limited role—the review of 
factual determinations—and would also refer to 
situations in which the trial court s discretion is 
a matter of appellate court grace and the appel-
late court s role is reviewable over time and 
circumstances—the application of fact to law 
We believe it is better to change terms now than 
to attempt to construct and maintain two differ-
ent legal edifices, both of which rest upon the 
same phrase 
5. Returning to our earlier metaphor, the appel-
late court reviews for correctness the placement 
of the legal fences which delimit the pasture of 
tnal court discretion to determine what consti-
tutes reasonable suspicion. The decision when 
to create and where to place these fences is an 
issue of law, and no deference is accorded to the 
trial court. Not every case that reaches an ap-
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Our decision to characterize the review as 
something less than de novoh is largely due 
to the first factor spelled out by Professor 
Rosenberg: Reasonable-suspicion determina-
tions are highly fact dependent, and the fact 
patterns are quite variable.7 It would be 
impractical for an appellate court to review 
every reasonable-suspicion determination de 
novo and then pronounce whether each 
unique factual setting rises to the level of 
reasonable suspicion as a matter of law. If 
we were to try, it is likely that the resulting 
case law would be confusing and inconsistent. 
Our recent experience with the law of waiver, 
discussed in Soter's, shows that this concern 
is not fanciful. On the other hand, we are 
not precluding this court or the court of 
appeals from effectively fencing off parts of 
the discretionary pasture from trial judges 
once the reviewing courts have enough expe-
rience with certain recurring fact patterns 
that the legal effect of those patterns can be 
settled with comfort. However, except in 
those situations in which appellate courts feel 
comfortable in developing the law in such a 
manner, trial courts should be permitted 
some rein to grapple with the multitude of 
fact patterns that may constitute a reason-
able-suspicion determination. See Childress, 
125 F.R.D. at 338. 
[13] With this concept of reasonable sus-
picion in mind, we now address Pena's 
claims. Pena first argues that the trial court 
erred in finding that the stop by police was 
supported by reasonable suspicion. He 
claims that the police did not have reasonable 
suspicion because they had not interviewed 
the 7-Eleven clerk beforehand to assure that 
a crime had taken place. In response, the 
pellate court, however, must result m the estab-
lishment of a fence. Until the appellate court 
has fenced off a particular area of the pasture— 
that is, determined that a particular fact situation 
does or does not create reasonable suspicion as a 
matter of law—the trial court has discretion to 
venture into that area—in other words, to deter-
mine whether a given set of facts satisfies the 
legal standard of reasonable suspicion. 
6. We recognize that this "some discretion" stan-
dard is less than precise, but so are many legal 
standards. It is difficult to describe more exactly 
without the benefit of concrete factual scenarios. 
We anticipate that developing case law will fur-
ther illuminate the appropriate level of review. 
State maintains that the dispatched report 
was sufficient for the stop. 
The United States Supreme Court has 
held that an officer may stop and question a 
person "when the officer has reasonable, ar-
ticulable suspicion that the person has been, 
is, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity." United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696, 702-03, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d 
110 (1983). In determining whether such 
reasonable suspicion exists, we have indicat-
ed that under certain circumstances, police 
officers can rely on a dispatched report in 
making an investigatory stop. State v. 
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650-51 (Utah 1989). 
Here, we think that the dispatcher gave Offi-
cer Bench sufficient information for him to 
form a reasonable suspicion that Pena or the 
driver had committed a crime, justifying the 
stop of the car in which Pena was a passen-
ger. We cannot agree that Officer Bench 
was required to allow a suspect who matched 
the detailed description given by the store 
clerk to continue until another officer had the 
opportunity to go to the 7-Eleven store and 
interview the clerk. We therefore conclude 
that the trial court did not err in finding that 
the dispatched report contained articulable 
facts to support a finding of reasonable suspi-
cion. 
[14-17] Second, Pena argues that when 
the police finally read the Miranda warnings 
to him, he did not effectively waive his rights 
because he did not fully understand English. 
A waiver of Miranda rights may be inferred 
from a defendant's "actions and words," 
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 
99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979), 
and is based on the "totality of the circum-
7. The multitude of variable fact patterns is easily 
demonstrated. See State v. Ramirez, 817 ? 2d 
774, 787-88 (Utah 1991) (no reasonable suspi-
cion when a man seen walking near defendant 
ran away); State v. Carpena 714 P.2d 674, 675 
(Utah 1986) (vehicle moving at slow speed in 
previously burglarized neighborhood at 3 a.m. 
did not provide articulable facts on which to 
formulate reasonable suspicion); State v. Mun-
sen, 821 P.2d 13, 16 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (wom-
an's vague and suspicious responses did not pro-
vide basis to suspect that she had committed or 
was about to commit crime). 
STATE 
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stances." State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 224 
(Utah 1989) (citing Fare v. Michael C, 442 
U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572, 61 L.Ed.2d 
197 (1979)). We review the trial court's legal 
conclusion of a valid waiver for correctness. 
State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1111 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991), cert, denied, — U.S. , 112 
S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992). Howev-
er, this standard of review grants a measure 
of discretion to the trial court because of the 
variability of the factual settings. See, e.g., 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 466-67 (Utah 
1988). Here, the trial court found that Pena 
had no problem understanding English. 
Based on that factual determination, we find 
no error in the conclusion that Pena validly 
waived his rights.8 
[18] Pena next claims that his arrest for 
giving false information to a police officer 
was a pretext for the strip search and conse-
quently was illegal. This contention is based 
on the assumption that the arrest was im-
proper. Because we find that the officers 
had probable cause to arrest Pena, we do not 
consider his pretext argument. Archuleta, 
850 P.2d at 1237-38. 
[19] Finally, Pena claims that the strip 
search at the jail was unnecessary and intru-
sive and violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights. Specifically, he argues that the mis-
demeanor arrest could not give rise to a valid 
concern that he was carrying contraband or 
weapons into the jail facility and, therefore, 
the strip search was unjustified. 
In response, the State argues that under 
federal law, strip searches are justifiable un-
der circumstances amounting to less than 
probable cause when the need to prevent 
introduction of narcotics or contraband into a 
holding cell outweighs the invasion of person-
al rights. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 
S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the United 
States Supreme Court considered the consti-
8- Pena also argues that once the vehicle was 
stopped and he was asked to exit the car, he was 
m custody or was "arrested" and therefore the 
police were required to read him the Miranda 
warnings before ever asking his name. Because 
the argument was not raised below, we do not 
consider it. 
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tutionality of strip searches following an ar-
rest. The Court stated: 
The test of reasonableness under the 
Fourth Amendment is not capable of pre-
cise definition or mechanical application. 
In each case it requires a balancing of the 
need for the particular search against the 
invasion of personal rights that the search 
entails. Courts must consider the scope of 
the particular intrusion, the manner in 
which it is conducted, the justification for 
initiating it, and the place in which it is 
conducted. 
Id. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884. 
In this case, the trial court found that the 
strip search was supported by a reasonable 
suspicion that Pena wTas carrying drugs. Of-
ficer Buckholts knew that Pena had been 
arrested for a drug offense, and he had ob-
served Pena with his handcuffed hands in the 
back of his pants as though attempting to 
conceal something. On that factual basis, we 
cannot say that the trial court erred in con-
cluding that a strip search was justified. 
[20] We have considered Pena's other ar-
guments and find them to be without merit.9 
We affirm the trial court's denial of Pena's 
motions to suppress. 
STEWART, Associate C.J., and HALL 
and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the result. 
HALL, J., acted on this case prior to his 
retirement. 
O 5 KEY NUMBER SYSTEM £ 
9. Pena also argues that the officers "exceeded 
the permissible scope of the interference," but he 
is precluded from making this argument because 
he did not raise it at the suppression hearing. 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) 
("[W]here a defendant fails to assert a particular 
ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained evi-
dence in the trial court, an appellate court will 
not consider that ground on appeal."). 
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Okay, this is Bob Harmon. I am in, I am near Lehi and it's the 
21st of November, 1989. I!m talking to Paul Hardman and I!m 
recording our conversation, I want to make sure that's alright with 
you, could you say 
A. yes, that fine 
Q, Okay, Ifm going to turn the recorder off. Okay, I got the 
recorder back on, ah, getting some background information on ah, a 
horse car accident that happened last night ah, on Redwood Road 
right near your house, is that right? 
A. yes, it was 
Q. Okay, and it involved, I guess the animal involved was your 
horse, is that correct? 
A. yes, it was 
Q. Now you were going to give me some background information on 
this so why don!t you just go ahead. 
A. Ever since ah, ever since deer season wefve had a lot of 
problems with hunters coming in over here on this north pasture 
which is just east of Camp Williams and I put a new fence up on the 
north side and UNCLEAR pulling the other fence down so they can 
drive in down to the river and go deer hunting, after that 
accident, after the accident last night which by the way they 
pulled down three times during the deer season, I of course rebuilt 
the fence each time, so this morning, early this morning I came 
over and I still had three horse were out and so I came over and 
put them in and this canal where were going along now they came 
along this canal road UNCLEAR followed them along here as you get 
over here you'll see I found a fresh deer kill where someone 
poached a deer, and this, this will be, it'll be fairly close to 
the fence which they tore down also and then when we get on down 
here will find where they've taken the wire off of the corner post, 
lifted up over the top of the corner post, let the fence down so 
that they can get in on the property and do whatever they were 
going to do, well, that fence was up last Thursday, which was 4 
days ago UNCLEAR time I was over here plowing and see this UNCLEAR 
plowing on, I was over here plowing and checked the fence on 
Thursday and then of course they got out now, I don't know if you 
want to take a picture of whats left here of this deer kill or not, 
maybe we ought to, 
Q. Well, we'll go take a look at it. 
A. I had the officer come and look at it and he didn't really do 
much with it. 
Q. Okay, 
A. there is not a lot left, a match box here, you can see the 
bloods still fresh here, ah, this morning there was a lot of 
UNCLEAR right here and that oojich is all thats left now UNCLEAR I 
had the county sheriff come out -cms mox.ii.Lnej and broughr him over 
and showed him this kill and UNCLEAR went on down UNCLEAR 
Q. Okay, now you say ah, you were here last Thursday plowing this 
field and the wire, fence was up that day, that was just the 
previous Thursday, this being Tuesday and the accident happened 
Monday night okay. 
A. so it would have been three days prior 
Q. Okay, now he has mentioned that ever since the deer hunting 
season opened you have had problems with people taking these 
strands of wire on this fence down. 
A. yeah, when we get over there I will show you, they drive 
through there with there 4 wheelers and they can't get through 
since I put that fence up to fence off. 
Q. When did you put that fence up? 
A. well, its been up for years but it was an electric fence and 
deer kept knocking the fence down and so this year 1 pur up the 
barbed wire fence because—of the deer knocking the electric fence 
down and then I had no fence, so I put m e uaroea wire-fence up 
this year and then they, they've actually twice they took their 
undone the fence on the corner and I assume that's what it looked 
like, and hooked it on their four wheeler on their trailer hitch 
and just pulled the fence as far as they could pull it and pull the 
whole fence down. 
Q. Oh, wow. 
A. and then once, and then the third time they left the fence on 
but they bent all the posts down right even with the ground just 
bent them all the metal posts, and now this time they disconnected 
it again and left, and just dropped it down the ground so they 
could come in and ah, the officer asked me, well are you sure that 
the horses didn!t do it, well we know that as I showed him because 
the fence was on the inside of the pasrure UNCLEAR were along the 
inside when tne norses went"""dul:~you~kriow"~would have pushed it the 
other way and also if the horses would have done it, its brand new 
barbed wire big barbs on it, it would have, for them to do that it 
would have just cut the heck out of them, whoever did it and no of 
the horses have cuts, yeah, so someown had to let it down. 
Q. So how many of your horses got out this last night? 
A. well, let see I go*c, some of them are my dads but all total 
what was there ah, let see there were three up there and there 
were, probably eight, eight or nine got our last night, some of 
them srayed in I think eight or nine got out, 
Q, How about going back further, have you ever had any of your 
ah, do you just have horses is that the only animals? 
A. yeah, well I've got one cow and a few sheep but thats 
Q. Have you ever had any of your animals, horses, sheep or cattle 
hit in the past, before last night? 
A. I had two lambs hit, quite a few years ago, up at the house 
Q. At the house, did they get out of a pen or something or how 
were they hit? 
A- they ah, as I recall, they crawled through a hole, or went 
under the UNCLEAR fence or yeah, it was 
Q. Okay, in this field where you are going to take me where these 
horses got out, had you ever had any of those horses get out and 
get hit? 
A. no, never had 
Q. Okay, and how long have you had horses in this field that your 
going to take me and show me? 
A. well, I change them, I have a pasture below the house and I 
run them all summer and then I bring them over here in the fall 
usually in September ah, cause they've eaten the other pasture off 
and so I bring them over here and run there from September til the 
snow gets deep, okay, then after that I take them up to the house. 
Q. I see, now you mention that you have had trouble with 
apparenty hunters, poachers and hunters knocking down your fence. 
A. this fall 
Q. This fall and ah, ah, when they knocked it down previously had 
you ever had your horses get out then? 
A. yeah, they got out about every time they knocked it, in fact 
I would come home from work and I would see they would be out, 
usually they would be feeding in this stuble field, we can see 
right here, and so I would come over and put them in and after I 
would put them in I would drive along the fence and that's how I 
you know found out that it was down. Now Camp Williams, all this 
area here is closed. Camp Williams is you know, we came through the 
meral gates and there is another one down on this road, the only 
way possible for those people to get in is up through Camp Williams 
and we have had, they've had alot of problems this fall, he was 
telling me this morning. 
Q. Who was telling you? 
A. Major Huff at Camp Williams was telling me that the last two 
weeks they've had one truck stolen, a bunch of tools stolen the ah, 
officer's quarters, or the officers club, they broke in there and 
vandalized the officers club and plus alot of other vandalism in 
the last two weeks plus about I guess it was during the deer hunt 
right in there the large metal gate we just came through, there is 
another one right down here on this lower UNCLEAR and they cam in 
and the pulled those and you can see how big the gates were but 
they hooked onto those and pulled them over and just tore the gates 
apart with upright the support post bent them right over to the 
ground and totally destroyed them, they had to put new, they just 
put those in a week ago, replaced those gates, but all the problem 
we have had is not people coming in from the south but the people 
coming in from the north, everything seems to you know somebody 
coming in from the north, whether they come through, well, they got 
to come through Camp Williams thats all I can visualize, otherwise 
they wouldn't have pulled the gate in from, from inside out. 
Q. Okay, now once, how many times then has your fenced been 
pulled down this fall? 
A. this is four times 
Q. This is the fourth time. 
A. fourth time 
Q. Okay, and each time you have put it back up? 
A. each time I have rebuilt the fence, I have called Major Huff, 
ah, ah, he can verify all the problems that we've been having and 
tearing my fences down. 
Q. Did you strenghten your fence at any time, any of these times 
that you've built it up? 
A- well last time I out some corner braces in on a corner post 
because when tne pulled it down they loosened up the corner post so 
I put some braces 
Q. Are the metal posts set in concrete? 
A. no, no their driven in 
Q. Driven into the ground, okay, is there anyplace else where you 
could have kept your horses instead of down here? 
A. not that I wouldn't had to feed them, no, I feed them hay 
Q. Yeah, during the winter you have to do that? 
A. yeah, but you know that's why I save this for the fall so that 
you know I can get along without feeding hay as long as I can, 
cause there running, there must be 120 acres, J.30 ac£es that 
they've got there to run in so, 
Q. Okay, let me go ahead and turn the recorder off again. 
Q. Now when was the last time previous to this incident last 
night when your horses got out? 
A. well after the deer hunt was over, I've not had any problems 
with the horses getting out, the fence has been left up and they 
just stayed in. 
Q. So the three previous times this fall that you fence was torn 
down was during the deer hunting season? 
A. correct, also, perhaps and I'll show you some posts or corner 
posts over here on a gate, where they took a shot gun and shot the 
post right off, you can't UNCLEAR the post was cut off at ground 
level and left the gate down and the horses got out the fence and 
they shot a bunch of holes in the adjoining post which was a big 
power pole and we can see the holes that go through the posts but 
they didn't quite cut that one off, so its time now if the horses 
were out ah, two days ago they were out and I came over and someone 
had UNCLEAR fence up the two barbs top and bottom together so they 
could crawl through the fence and there was only about three horses 
out then, baby horses the big horses couldn't crawl through the 
hole but the babies did. 
Q. I see, so ah, so you had some younger horses out then just a 
couple days before this accident? 
A. yes 
Q. Same area then? 
A. yeahf same, I'll show you there within 50 yards from where 
they took the fence down. 
Q. Okay, ITm going to go ahead and shut the recorder off again. 
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"Q. Now you say as you recall, do you have a clear recollection of your conversations with Mr. Harmon? . . . Do you remember what you 
told him? 
A. The same as I told you, as I recall." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 130, 131) 
"Q. Tell me specifically what you said to Mr. Harmon regarding trespassing, poaching problems? 
A. Basically the same thing I've told you, that in the springtime, we had problems with fishermen letting the fences down or tearing the 
fences down, pushing the gate over because they didn't want to walk down to the river to fish. And in the fall time, we had problems with the 
hunters, mourning dove hunters, rolling up fences. Or hunters don't know how to crawl through fences. They have to roll the wires or push 
the fence over to get in. The same thing I've said before." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 135) 
"Q. What else did you say to the sheriff, this representative, during that morning? 
A. Nothing that I recall. I mentioned the problems we had with trespassers and, again, with the poachers. And he made a comment that he 
would make a note of that and they would put extra patrols on out there. 
Q. So you told the sheriffs representative you'd had problems with trespassers and poachers? 
A. Yes. He and Bob Harmon, about the same I told them, you know. I don't recall saying one thing different to one than to the other." 
(Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 145-146) 
SUBJECT 
Condition of the 
Fence on the 
Day Following the 
Accident 
"Q. Now you were going to give me some 
background information on this so why don't 
you just go ahead. 
A. . . . they've taken the wire off of the 
corner post, lifted up over the top of the 
corner post, let the fence down so that they 
can get in on the property and do whatever 
they were going to do . . . . 
. . . they disconnected it again and left, and 
just dropped it down the ground so they could 
come in . . . . 
. . . the officer asked me, well are you sure 
that the horses didn't do it, well we know that 
as I showed him because the fence was on the 
inside of the pasture UNCLEAR were along 
the inside when the horses went out you know 
would have pushed it the other way and also 
if the horses would have done it, it's brand 
new barbed wire big barbs on it, it would 
have, for them to do that it would have just 
cut the heck out of them, whoever did it and 
no of the horses have cuts, yeah, so someone 
had to let it down." (Statement, pp. 1-3) 
C:\WP51\ASKEW\101214.TBL 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. So the next morning you went down to 
the pasture? 
A. Yes. . . . the wire of the fence was on 
the inside of the pasture, that it had been 
taken off from the post, it wasn't cut, it was-
n't broken. It had been taken off from the 
corner post and was on the inside of the 
pasture." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. 
I, p. 101, 106) 
"Q. How many wires had been taken off the 
corner post? 
A. Two. 
Q. . . . How much of the fence had been 
taken down? 
A. . . . from the corner, probably three 
steel poles. It was all drooping. But I mean, 
you know, laying on the ground, as I recall, 
there were maybe three poles." (Deposition 
of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 108-109) 
"Q. And was there a reason that you thought 
the horses would stay in the pasture given the 
fence was down? 
A. . . . My biggest concern was the fact 
that the fence was down and that the wires 
were on the inside of the fence. . . . I knew 
that someone had let the fence down because 
if the horses had got out because they pushed 
the fence over, the wires would have been on 
the north side of the fence rather than on the 
inside, or they would have been on the out-
side. . . . I know I'm not liable because the 
wires had been taken off from the corner 
posts and the wires were on the inside of the 
pasture on the winter pasture." (Deposition 
of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 112-113) 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. While you're in that vicinity, can you 
point out for the jury where, on the morning 
of November 21st, you observed your fence 
being down on the ground? 
A. Up on the northwest corner in this area 
right here." (Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 
7) 
"Q. And the corner post has orange painted 
on it; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it from that corner that you ob-
served the fence having been let down? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the fence, as you observed it that 
morning, was let down from that post? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then back two or three poles from 
there; is that right? 





Deer Kill on the 
Day Following the 
Accident 
RECORDED STATEMENT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. Now you were going to give me some 
background information on this so why don't 
you just go ahead. 
A. . . . I found a fresh deer kill where 
someone poached a deer, and this, this will 
be, it'll be fairly close to the fence which they 
tore down also . . . . I don't know if you 
want to take a picture of what's left here of 
this deer kill or not, maybe we ought to. . . . 
you can see the blood still fresh here, ah, this 
morning there was a lot of UNCLEAR right 
here and that ponch is all that's left now 
UNCLEAR I had the county sheriff come out 
this morning and brought him over and 
showed him this kill . . . ." (Statement, pp. 
1-2) 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. And the horses then were grazing in 
that area? 
A. Horses were grazing here . . . . And as 
I was coming along the canal, I noticed some 
magpies . . . . So the magpies, as I got over 
there, there had been a deer killed there. 
There was entrails, deer entrails, and they 
were almost gone. They had eaten a good 
share of them." (Deposition of Paul Hard-
man, Vol. I, pp. 106-107) 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN | 
Paul Hardman was not asked at trial about 
his observations of the deer kill. Officer 
Jerry Monson, the Utah County Sheriff offi-
cer called to the scene on the morning fol-
lowing the occurrence, testified as follows at 
trial: 
"Q. Let me ask you, Mr. Monson, what 
your report states under 'observation.' I 
believe that's what Mr. Morgan just referred 
to. 
A. Do you want me to read it? 
Q. Sure. Please. 
A. 'Reporting deputy responds to scene 
with the R.P.' - with the reporting party -
'and observed where the fence was down. It 
appeared someone had knocked the fence 
down with a full-size pickup truck as there 
were old tire tracks near the fence. Also 
reporting deputy observed where a deer had 
recently been poached on the reporting 
party's property.' 
Q. You reference in your report that a 
deer had recently been poached. How could 
you tell a deer had recently been poached? 
A. That was an assumption I made. I saw 
a pile of entrails or innards in the vicinity of 
where the fence was down." (Testimony of 




Maintenance of the 
Fence Before 
Horses Were 
Moved into the 
Winter Pasture 
RECORDED STATEMENT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. Now you were going to give me some 
background information on this so why don't 
you just go ahead. 
A. . . . I put a new fence up on the north 
side . . . ." (Statement, p. 1) 
"Q. When did you put that fence up? 
A. . . . I put up the barbed wire fence 
because of the deer knocking the electric 
fence down and then I had no fence, so I put 
the barbed wire fence up this year. . . . " 
(Statement, p. 2) 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. And had you replaced all the wire 
around the pasture a year earlier than Novem-
ber 21, '89? 
A. No, just the north. . . . it was electric 
fence, so I took the electric fence down and 
put in barbed wire. 
Q. Why did you determine not to use an 
electric fence on the north side of the fence 
anymore? 
A. Maintenance. . . . I didn't have to 
worry about weeds growing up or getting 
under anything like that." (Deposition of Paul 
Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 147-149) 
"Q. Now I believe you have alleged during 
the context of this lawsuit that you hired two 
gentlemen to repair all or part of the fence 
surrounding the winter pasture in 1989; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. . . . I just told them to repair the 
fence as needed, put new wire up if needed, 
new posts, whatever it needs." (Deposition of 
Paul Hardman, Vol. II, pp. 178, 185) 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. . . . up until the summer of 1989 you 
' had an electric fence along this north fence 
line; is that right? 
A. . . . the deer would come along the 
bottom of the river where the fence drops 
over the hill . . . . An electric fence ~ if 
they hit that fence, it was very easy to knock 
over because it's not tied to the post substan-
tially. Plus it's a much smaller wire, so they 
could break the wire. And I was concerned 
about the deer knocking the fence over . . . . 
So I changed the fence to a two-strand 
barbed wire fence on the north fence." 
(Testimony of Paul Hardman, pp. 58-59) 
"Q. Now, how do you know that the dis-
tance between the poles and the height of the 
wire is closer to being accurate . . . than the 
estimates . . . you were asked to give at the 
time your deposition was taken? 
A. So this fall, after I did my annual fall 
maintenance on the fence, which I always do 
before I put the horses in after the wire was 
stretched and the fence was prepared to put 
the horses in, I made the diagram." (Testi-
mony of Paul Hardman, pp. 96-97) 
"Q. Did Doug Smith repair your fence 
about four weeks before, three or four weeks 
before the accident? 
A. Yes, he did." (Rebuttal Testimony of 
Paul Hardman, p. 24) 
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SUBJECT RECORDED STATEMENT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
Prior Occurrences 
of Fence Being 
Torn Down 
"Q. Now you were going to give me some 
background information on this so why don't 
you just go ahead. 
A. . . . after the accident last night which 
by the way they pulled down three times 
during the deer season, I of course rebuilt the 
fence each time . . . ." (Statement, p. 1) 
"Q. When did you put that fence up? 
A. . . . so I put the barbed wire fence up 
this year and then they, they've actually twice 
they took their undone the fence on the corner 
and I assume that's what it looked like, and 
hooked it on their four wheeler on their trailer 
hitch and just pulled the fence as far as they 
could pull it and pull the whole fence down. . 
. . and then once, and then the third time they 
left the fence on but they bent all the posts 
down right even with the ground just bent 
them all the metal posts . . . ." (Statement, 
p. 2) 
"Q. Okay, now once, how many times then 
has your fenced been pulled down this fall? 
A. This is four times." (Statement, p. 4) 
"Q. Now when was the last time previous to 
this incident last night when your horses got 
out? 
A. . . . well after the deer hunt was over, 
I've not had any problems with the horses 
getting out, the fence has been left up and 
they just stayed in." (Statement, p. 5) 
"Q. . . . Again, we're talking a time two 
weeks before November 20, '89. . . . And 
how did you come to understand that someone 
had pulled the fence down? 
A. Because all the posts were bent over and 
the wire was stretched out just to the north of 
the pasture just as far as it could go. 
Q. The wires had been taken off the posts? 
A. Yes. . . . I think they took the wires off 
from the posts, hooked them on their trailer 
hitch, took off with the four-wheelers and it 
bent all the metal posts. . . . " (Deposition of 
Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 73) 
"Q. . . . I'm curious to understand the basis 
for your understanding that it was trespassers 
or poachers in your belief that had allowed 
the horses to get out. 
A. We seem to have two seasons out there 
of people that come in. In the spring, fisher-
men, they come. They let the fences down. . 
. . They'll tear the fences totally out, do 
whatever they can to drive down to the river 
to go fishing. Now there are no horses in 
there in the spring, but the fact of the matter 
is that it is trespassers and mostly fishermen 
that are tearing the fences. We have a lot of 
problems with them tearing the fences down. 
. . . So when something happens, you know, 
in my mind, I automatically go to trespassers, 
fishermen, or hunters." (Deposition of Paul 
Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 82-83) 
"Q. . . . is it not true that you have had to 
put the fence up many times even when the 
horses weren't in as a result of trespassing? 
A. Over the years that's a true statement." 
(Rebuttal Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 3) 
"Q. When you talked to Deputy Sheriff 
Monson you told him that trespassers had 
knocked your fences down several times 
since the deer hunt; is that right? 
A. When I talked to Deputy Sheriff Mon-
son, I was referring to three incidents prior 
to the accident, including the accident." 
(Rebuttal Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 9) 
"Q. . . . we're referring now to Deputy 
Monson's report, where it says the RP, 
which meant reporting party, said 'He has 
put that section of fence up three times since 
the deer hunt but the hunters keep knocking 
it down.' Did you say that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. 'Was that an accurate statement?' And 
your answer was, 'Could have been two 
times rather than three.' Is that right? 
A. Yes." (Rebuttal Testimony of Paul 
Hardman, pp. 10-11) 
"Q. The report you gave to Mr. Monson is 
that the fence had been torn down by hunters 
two or three times since the deer hunt, was 
what, the day after the accident? 
A. Day after the accident." (Rebuttal 
Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 13) 
C:\WP51\ASKEW\101214.TBL 5 
SUBJECT 
The Repair of 
the Fence During 
the Fall Hunting 
Season 
RECORDED STATEMENT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. Now you were going to give me some 
background information on this so why don't 
you just go ahead. 
A. . . . after the accident last night which 
by the way they pulled down three times 
during the deer season, I of course rebuilt the 
fence each time . . . ." (Statement, 
P- 1) 
"Q. Okay, now once, how many times then 
has your fenced been pulled down this fall? 
A. This is four times. 
Q. Okay, and each time you have put it 
back up? 
A. . . . each time I have rebuilt the fence . 
. . . " (Statement, p. 4) 
"Q. Did you strengthen your fence at any 
time, any of these times that you've built it 
up? 
A. . . . well last time I put some corner 
braces in on a corner post because when the 
pulled it down they loosened up the corner 
post so I put some braces." (Statement, p. 5) 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. How did you go about fixing the fence 
[when it was torn down approximately two 
weeks before the incident]? 
A. Bent the posts back up straight, 
stretched the wire back to the corner posts, 
tied it on, then secured the barbed wire back 
to . . . the metal post." (Deposition of Paul 
Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 75-76) 
"Q. If I could refer you to the last sentence 
of that section [of the Utah County Offense 
Report printed 12/18/89] where it says the RP 
said he has put that section of fence up three 
times since the deer hunt, but the hunters 
keep knocking it down. Do you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall having made that state-
ment to the officer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that an accurate statement? 
A. Could have been two times rather than 
three. 
Q. You recall having put the fence up at 
least two times? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And perhaps three? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would that be prior to the occasion on 
November 20, 1989, when the fence was 
knocked down? 
A. Yes, yes." (Deposition of Paul Hard-
man, Vol. II, pp. 195-196) 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. If you'll turn to page 195 in your depo-
sition, that's your second deposition. Are 
you there? 
Bottom of page 195, line 22 the question 
is, if I could refer you to the last sentence of 
that section, we're referring now to Deputy 
Monson's report, where it says the RP, 
which meant reporting party, said, 'He has 
put that section of fence up three times since 
the deer hunt but the hunters keep knocking 
it down.' Did you say that? 
A. Yes." (Rebuttal Testimony of Paul 
Hardman, pp. 9-10) 
"Q. If you'll turn to page 198 of your 
deposition, beginning on line 10, the question 
was, 'Do you recall whether on the two or 
three times prior to November 20, 1989 that 
the fence had been knocked down?' 
Now, I'm referencing the period of the 
deer hunt of 1989 up through November 20, 
1989. 'Do you recall on any of those occa-
sions whether Mr. Smith or Mr. Allred fixed 
the fence after it had been knock down?' 
Your answer was, 'No, they did not.' Ques-
tion, 'You fixed the fence?' The answer, 
'Yes'; is that correct? 
A. That's what I said." (Rebuttal Testimo-
ny of Paul Hardman, p. 15) 
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SUBJECT 
The Repair of 
the Fence During 
the Fall Hunting 
Season 
(cont'd) 
RECORDED STATEMENT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN | 
"Q. . . . The question was, 'And since 
between the time of the ten days after, I take 
it, the third Saturday of October of '89 and 
November 20 of 1989 you had put the fence 
up at least two and maybe three times be-
cause of it having been knocked down by 
someone; is that accurate?' 
Answer, 'It could have included the time 
period of the deer hunt from --' Question, 
'Of the October '89 deer hunt?' Answer, 
'Yes.'" (Rebuttal Testimony of Paul Hard-
man, p. 21) 
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SUBJECT RECORDED STATEMENT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
Prior Occurrences 
of Horses Escaping 
from Pasture 
"Q. This fall and ah, ah, when they knocked 
it down previously had you ever had your 
horses get out then? 
A. . . . yeah, they got out about every time 
they knocked it, in fact I would come home 
from work and I would see they would be 
out, usually they would be feeding in this 
stuble field, we can see right here, and so I 
would come over and put them in and after I 
would put them in I would drive along the 
fence and that's how I you know found out 
that it was down." (Statement, p. 4) 
"Q. Now when was the last time previous to 
this incident last night when your horses got 
out? 
A. . . . well after the deer hunt was over, 
I've not had any problems with the horses 
getting out, the fence has been left up and 
they just stayed in." (Statement, p. 5) 
"Q. So the three previous times this fall that 
your fence was torn down was during the deer 
hunting season? 
. . . two days ago they were out and I came 
over and someone had UNCLEAR fence up 
the two barbs top and bottom together so they 
could crawl through the fence and there was 
only about three horses out then, baby horses 
the big horses couldn't crawl through the hole 
but the babies did." (Statement, p. 5) 
"Q. Now with respect to any of the two or 
three times that you've described, did horses 
escape on any of those occasions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many of those occasions did horses 
escape? 
A. Maybe all two or three. I'm not sure. 
Q. Do you recall on any of those two or 
three occasions when the horses escaped 
where they went? 
A. . . . Not all of them had escaped at one 
time. Some were out. The time I can re-
member, there were three or four that were 
out, and the rest were still in the pasture. 
And they stayed right there at the pasture. 
They didn't go anywhere." (Deposition of 
Paul Hardman, Vol. II, pp. 199-200) 
"Q. Other than this occasion in 1988 and the 
occasion in 1989 on November 20, are you 
aware of any other occasion when horses 
escaped from the winter pasture? 
A. . . . After I put the horses in in October 
of '89, towards the end or during the deer 
hunting period, the fence had been taken 
down and the horses had gotten out during 
that period. . . . 
Q. Do you recall how many days or weeks 
prior to the evening of the accident that oc-
curred? 
A. Approximately maybe two weeks, a 
week to two weeks." (Deposition of Paul 
Hardman, Vol. I, p. 71) 
"Q. Have your horses ever pushed through 
a barbed wire fence? 
A. I've never known my horses to push 
through a barbed wire fence, no." (Testi-
mony of Paul Hardman, p. 112) 
"Q. Now with respect to any of the two or 
three times that you described, did horses 
escape on any of those occasions and your 
answer was yes. 'How many of those occa-
sions did horses escape?' Your answer? 
A. 'Maybe all two or three. I'm not 
sure.'" (Rebuttal testimony of Paul Hard-
man, pp. 11-12) 
"Q. . . . Question, 'Is your recollection 
such that you can deny that they escaped 
other than on the one occasion?' Your an-
swer, 'No, not all of them had escaped at 
one time. Some were out. The time I can 
remember there were three or four that were 
out and the rest were still in the pasture and 
they stayed right there in the pasture. They 
didn't go anywhere.' Did I read that accu-
rately? 
A. That's right and I think that clarifies 
the question previous, that the time that they 
had escaped, I said three, and refers to the 
one time, and it also refers on one of those 
other questions that I couldn't recall exactly 
how many times. And again, Counselor, this 
is three years after the fact and it's difficult 
to remember specific times and days." (Re-





of Horses Escaping 
from Pasture 
(cont'd) 
RECORDED STATEMENT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. Okay, in this field where you are going 
to take me where these horses got out, had 
you ever had any of those horses get out and 
get hit? 
A. No, never had." (Statement, p. 3) 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. And do recall how it was that you came 
to know that the horses escaped? . . . 
A. . . . when I came down to plow, I saw 
they were out. They were eating over in that 
alfalfa field. So I went over to see why, I 
mean, to see why they were out. And I 
noticed that someone pulled the fence down." 
(Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 73) 
"Q. Other than the occasions we've dis-
cussed, . . . are you aware of any other occa-
sion when horses owned by you escaped from 
the summer pasture or the winter pasture? 
A. I can't tell you a year or a day. I 
mean, I can't even recall them being out. But 
there may be times when they got out in that 
period of time. That's a long time ago." 
(Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 78) 
"Q. Why did you assume in making that 
statement that the horses had escaped because 
of trespassers or poachers? 
A. Because the only time that the horses 
were out was because of trespassers or poach-
ers. (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 
82) 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN | 
"Q. . . . with regard to putting the fence 
up, did horses get out of the pasture on any 
one of those occasions when you put the 
fence back up other than the one time two 
weeks before the accident and the date of the 
accident? 
A. The horses had only been out the one 
time." (Rebuttal Testimony of Paul Hard-






RECORDED STATEMENT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. Now you were going to give me some 
background information on this so why don't 
you just go ahead. 
A. . . . that fence was up last Thursday, 
which was 4 days ago UNCLEAR time I was 
over here plowing and see this UNCLEAR 
plowing on, I was over here plowing and 
checked the fence on Thursday and then of 
course they got out now." (Statement, pp. 1-
2) 
"Q. Okay, now you say ah, you were here 
last Thursday plowing this field and the wire, 
fence was up that day, that was just the previ-
ous Thursday, this being Tuesday and the 
accident happened Monday night okay. 
A. So it would have been three days prior." 
(Statement, p. 2)* 
*Paul Hardman was not asked during the 
taking of his statement about his practice for 
checking the fence that surrounds the winter 
pasture. He was also not asked if he checked 
the fences on the day of the occurrence. 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. Do you recall the time you got off 
work? 
A. Somewhere around 4:00. . . . The day 
of the accident, I left Geneva, I drove down 
to the pasture, drove along the road, and just 
observed the fences from the vehicle when I 
drove down, looked at them." (Deposition of 
Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 86) 
"Q. And you drove along that road the 
afternoon of the 20th at approximately 4:30? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you specifically observed that the 
fence was up? 
A. Yes." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, 
Vol. I, p. 88) 
"Q. Is that something that you had ever 
done before? 
A. . . . When I get up in the mornings, one 
of the first things I do is walk over to the 
window and look in my binoculars to see 
what's going on out there. . . . I look out 
there many times a day if I'm any time in the 
bedroom . . . . And the other way that I 
would check those fences is I'd physically 
drive over there two, three times a week to 
check. Well, plus I'm farming over there . . 
. and so I'm in that vicinity anyway." (Depo-
sition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, pp. 95-96) 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. And you had been there at 4:30 p.m. 
on the evening of - afternoon of November 
20, 1989; is that correct? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And at that time did you make a visual 
personal observation of the fence line on the 
north end? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And did you daily check your fences 
the two weeks prior to the accident on No-
vember 20? 
A. Yes, I did." (Testimony of Paul Hard-
man, p. 150) 
"Q. You said that three times a week you 
would inspect this fence immediately preced-
ing the accident; is that correct? 
A. I said every day. 
Q. Oh. Every day, then? 
A. We're talking about two to three weeks 
before the accident, yes." (Testimony of 






Prior Incidents of 
Trespassing 
RECORDED STATEMENT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. Now you were going to give me some 
background information on this so why don't 
you just go ahead. 
A. Ever since deer season we've had a lot 
of problems with hunters coming in over here 
on this north pasture which is just east of 
Camp Williams . . . pulling the other fence 
down so they can drive in down to the river 
and go deer hunting . . . ." (Statement, p. 1) 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. And those daily driveby observations 
occurred in the fall of 1989? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On a daily basis? 
A. Average three times a week. There 
may be a day during the week that I didn't go 
over there." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, 
Vol. II, pp. 278-279) 
"Q. Now you refer to daily field glass 
checks from house? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were those daily field glass checks 
conducted during November of '89? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who conducted those checks? 
A. I usually always check. And many 
times my wife would check also, so some-
times they'd get checked twice." (Deposition 
of Paul Hardman, Vol. II, p. 279) 
"Q. Tell me approximately how many in-
stances of trespassing . . . you experienced in 
the spring with respect to the winter pasture 
in the five years prior to November of 1989. 
A. Instances where the fences have been 
pushed over or gates let down, possibly may-
be five, six times a summer during the sum-
mer. 
Q. How about in the fall, the same time? 
A. Maybe one or two times." (Deposition 
of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 84) 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN | 
"Q. On November 20, 1989 at 4:30, tell us 
where you were and what observations you 
made. 
A. I came along this road here observing 
the fence line right next to the road . . . 
Q. Were the posts and wires in place on 
November 20, 1989 at 4:30 p.m. when you 
last saw it prior to the accident. 
A. Yes, sir." (Sur Rebuttal Testimony of 
Paul Hardman, pp. 2, 4) 
"Q. You had never previously had two or 
three incidents of trespassing in that short of 
time at that place in the north pasture; isn't 
that true? 
A. That's true." (Rebuttal Testimony of 
Paul Hardman, p. 14) 
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SUBJECT 
Prior Incidents of 
Trespassing 
(cont'd) 
RECORDED STATEMENT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. This fall and ah, ah, when they knocked 
it down previously had you ever had your 
horses get out then? 
A. . . . the only way possible for those 
people to get in is up through Camp Williams 
and we have had, they've had a lot of prob-
lems this fall, he was telling me this morn-
ing." (Statement, p. 4) 
"Q. Now when was the last time previous to 
this incident last night when your horses got 
out? 
A. . . . well after the deer hunt was over, 
I've not had any problems with the horses 
getting out, the fence has been left up and 
they just stayed in." (Statement, p. 5) 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. Were you aware of poaching problems 
in the vicinity of the winter pasture prior to 
November 20, 1989? 
A. Yes. . . . This is a popular area for 
people to poach because of the deer popula-
tion down there." (Deposition of Paul Hard-
man, Vol. I, p. 89) 
"Q. And so in part, the reason you checked 
it so often was because of the trespassing 
problems? 
A. Some, yes." (Deposition of Paul Hard-
man, Vol. I, pp. 96-97) 
"Q. Do you recall 1989 being any different 
than years before that with respect to the 
number of incidences of trespass in the vicini-
ty of the winter pasture? 
A. The instances where the north fence line 
had been taken down two or three times 
within a month, month and a half period, I've 
not had that problem prior to that." (Deposi-
tion of Paul Hardman, Vol. II, p. 223) 
"Q. Would it be fair to characterize the 
trespass problems in the area of the winter 
pasture as being much more severe or signifi-
cantly more severe than in the area of the 
summer pasture? 
A. Yes." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, 
Vol. II, pp. 224-225) 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. Then if you could turn in your second 
deposition to page 223, the question was 
asked at line 10, 'Do you recall 1989 being 
any different than years before that with 
respect to the number of incidences of tres-
pass in the vicinity of the winter pasture?' 
A. 'The incidences for the north fence line 
have been taken down two or three times 
within a month, month and a half. I have 
not had that problem prior to that.' 
Q. Was that your testimony? 
A. Yes." (Rebuttal Testimony of Paul 
Hardman, p. 28) 
"Q. You've had problems with hunters 
coming over there, is that right? 
A. Yes, that was prior to when we put the 
locked gates up, which was approximately 
seven or eight years prior to the accident." 
(Rebuttal Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 4) 
"Q. 'Were you aware of poaching problems 
in the vicinity of the winter pasture prior to 
November 20, 1989?' 
A. 'No. Trespassers, yes. Not poaching.' 
Q. Question, 'And what awareness did you 
have regarding poaching problems prior to 
November 20, 1989?' 
A. 'People down in there spotlighting.'" 
(Rebuttal Testimony of Paul Hardman, p. 23) 
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SUBJECT 
Reports to Camp 
Williams 
RECORDED STATEMENT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. Okay, and each time you have put it 
back up? 
A. . . . each time I have rebuilt the fence, I 
have called Major Huff, ah, ah, he can verify 
all the problems that we've been having and 
tearing my fences down." (Statement, p. 4) 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. Did you have any agreement with the 
guard service at Camp Williams that no one 
was to enter the winter pasture area without 
your written permission? 
A. . . . a number of times, we mentioned 
to Camp Williams that people were not to go 
onto our property without permission, written 
permission. And we told the guards at the 
gate." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, 
p. 22) 
"Q. And could you tell me approximately 
how many conversations you recall having or 
that you are aware of that were had with 
Camp Williams and the guard service regard-
ing access or entry to your pasture? 
A. If we had found trespassers down on 
our property, . . . I'd go up or call up at 
Camp Williams and just reemphasize the fact 
that we didn't want trespassers on our prop-
erty." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, 
pp. 23-24) 
"Q. Do you recall anyone in particular that 
you spoke with at Camp Williams about this 
matter? 
A. I have talked to Major Huff . . . ." 
(Deposition of Paul Hardman, Vol. I, p. 25) 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN | 
"Q. The two or three incidents immediately 
prior to the accident, you didn't report any of 
those to the Sheriff's Office, did you? 
A. Reported them to the guard service but 
did not call the police." (Rebuttal Testimony 
of Paul Hardman, p. 14) 
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SUBJECT 
Reports to Camp 
Williams 
(cont'd) 
RECORDED STATEMENT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN 
"Q. Did you have any discussions with 
Camp Williams regarding any of those occa-
sions when the fence had been knocked down? 
A. It's very possible that I did. 
Q. Do you have a specific recollection of 
any conversation? 
A. No. I talked to Camp Williams occa-
sionally or the guard gate if there had been 
problems, but I don't remember exactly when 
they were." (Deposition of Paul Hardman, 
Vol. II, p. 199) 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
PAUL HARDMAN | 
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